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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 This matter requires application of well-settled legal 
doctrines to an unusual set of facts.  As detailed below, Sara 
Lesende (“Lesende”) and her husband, Victor Lesende, 
brought suit against the City of Newark (“the City”) and 
Police Officer Arnold Borrero.  Following a five-day trial, a 
jury found that both Officer Borrero and the City were liable 
and awarded Lesende $2,700,000 in compensatory damages.  
The City moved for remittitur, and its motion was granted; 
the District Court remitted Lesende’s award to $750,000 and 
informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award 
or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the 
quantum of her compensatory damages.  She chose the latter 
option. 
 
 A second jury was convened and a new trial held, and 
the second jury awarded Lesende $4,000,000 in 
compensatory damages.  Thereafter, the City moved anew for 
remittitur.  The District Court did not directly resolve that 
motion.  Instead, after conferring with counsel for both 
Lesende and the City, the court entered a final order, vacating 
the second jury’s verdict, vacating the earlier-entered order 
that granted the City’s motion for remittitur from the first 
jury’s verdict, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict in its 
entirety.  The instant appeal and cross-appeal followed. 
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 On appeal, the City attacks the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented at trial.  It also asks us to consider 
whether the District Court erred either by failing to order a 
second trial on its liability or instructing the jury to apportion 
the above-mentioned damages award between Officer 
Borrero and the City.  Finally, it asks us to assign error to the 
vacatur of the second jury’s verdict and reinstatement of the 
first jury’s verdict, contending instead that the District Court 
should simply have reduced the second jury’s verdict to 
$750,000.  Lesende, as evidenced by the cross-appeal, agrees 
that the vacatur of the second verdict and reinstatement of the 
first verdict constitute legal error.  She argues, however, that 
error lies in the District Court’s entry of a compensatory 
damages award less than that found by the second jury—i.e., 
less than $4,000,000. 
 
 For the reasons detailed below, though we see little 
merit in the arguments raised in the appeal or cross-appeal, 
we will vacate the District Court’s final order and remand 
with instruction that the District Court should resolve the 
City’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict. 
 
I. 
 
A. The Nature of the Lesendes’ Lawsuit  
  
The Lesendes’ lawsuit was predicated on Lesende’s 
encounter with Officer Borrero on October 18, 2004.  The 
District Court described it as follows: 
 
 5 
Mrs. Lesende was pulled over by Mr. Borrero 
while she was searching for a parking spot near 
her home in Newark[, New Jersey].  At the 
time, Mr. Borrero was an officer in the Newark 
police department, but he was not on duty and 
was not in uniform.  For reasons that are 
unclear, Mr. Borrero started a loud argument 
with Mrs. Lesende, claiming that she had been 
driving her car in an unsafe fashion.  Believing 
that she did not accept his authority, Mr. 
Borrero produced his badge and gun.  He 
opened her car door, climbed on top of Mrs. 
Lesende and attacked her with his fists, causing 
serious injury to her neck, face and ribs.  A 
crowd gathered, and multiple witnesses testified 
that Mr. Borrero savagely assaulted Mrs. 
Lesende.  When an elderly bystander attempted 
to intervene, Mr. Borrero turned his weapon on 
the man and threatened to kill him. 
Additional officers arrived at the 
intersection, and Mrs. Lesende was handcuffed 
and taken to the police station.  Once at the 
station, Mrs. Lesende was held for the better 
part of a day without counsel.  During that time 
she was repeatedly harassed by Mr. Borrero.  
After approximately 12 hours of detention, Mrs. 
Lesende was charged with assaulting a police 
officer and resisting arrest and released on 
$10,000 bail. 
In the months following the arrest, Mrs. 
Lesende was forced to hire counsel and appear 
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in court on multiple occasions to answer the 
groundless and frivolous charges.  At the same 
time, the Newark Police Department engaged in 
efforts to intimidate witnesses and discourage 
any action against Mr. Borrero.  Indeed, Mr. 
Lesende testified that he was told by a Newark 
police officer that no action would ever be taken 
by the city against Mr. Borrero.  In addition, 
when Mr. Borrero was brought before [an] 
Administrative Law Judge on disciplinary 
charges, the city “neglected” to present his prior 
disciplinary history, permitting him to lie about 
the extent of his past misconduct and avoid 
termination.  Borrero’s extensive discipline file 
included 45 prior charges—including multiple 
findings that Mr. Borrero had either filed false 
assault charges or was “not credible” in his 
testimony. 
 
Lesende v. Borrero, No. 06-4967, 2011 WL 6001097, at *1-2 
(D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011). The District Court’s description of 
that incident, which substantially comports with the 
descriptions appearing in the briefs filed before this Court, 
has not been challenged. 
 
 The Lesendes brought suit in October of 2006.  
Lesende raised claims against Officer Borrero pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for use of excessive force, 
false arrest and/or imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.  
She also raised claims against the City pursuant to Section 
1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 
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658 (1978), for negligently training and supervising Officer 
Borrero and, separately, for failing to terminate his 
employment before October 18, 2004.  Her husband raised a 
derivative claim against Officer Borrero and the City for loss 
of consortium.
1
 
 
B. The First Trial 
 
 The first trial was held in June of 2011.  Both the 
Lesendes and the City were represented by counsel.  Officer 
Borrero was represented during jury selection and during the 
beginning of trial, but he thereafter appeared pro se and did 
not present a defense.
 2
 
 
                                                 
1
 Other claims were raised against Officer Borrero, the 
City, and various other named and fictitious defendants.  For 
our purposes, those claims are not relevant. 
 
2
 It appears that Officer Borrero was represented by 
attorneys retained via the Fraternal Order of Police, that he 
was dissatisfied with the services rendered by those attorneys, 
and that during trial he sought leave to find and hire other 
counsel.  (See J.A. 287-91.)  It further appears that the District 
Court, acting on Officer Borrero’s request, informally 
allowed his attorneys to withdraw from representation in this 
matter and instructed Officer Borrero that he “ha[d] four days 
before the trial resumes,” that it was his responsibility, if he 
so chose, to find other counsel, and that the trial would 
“proceed no matter what.”  (J.A. 290.) 
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Following the presentation of evidence, neither Officer 
Borrero nor the City moved for judgment as a matter of law 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).  Lesende, 
however, raised such a motion with respect to each of the 
three Section 1983 claims raised against Officer Borrero.  
This colloquy, which concerns both Lesende’s motion and the 
proposed jury questionnaire (i.e., the verdict sheet), followed: 
 
 THE COURT:  Well, normally I would 
defer a motion for directed verdict and expect 
the jury to do the work that I otherwise should 
have done.  And in normal cases no harm has 
been done that results from that, because I can 
always reverse it if I think, after further st[u]dy, 
it’s appropriate. 
 In this case there is a major problem.  
Should the jury find no, and I conclude there 
should be a judgment, then the jury would not 
have directed itself to the really critical question 
in this case, which is, has Mrs. Lesende proved 
that she’s been deprived of her rights as a result 
of a custom [or] policy [of] the City of Newark?  
So I think I’m going to have to rule on the 
directed verdict motion at this time, and . . . I 
will direct the jury to vote to check yes on each 
of those three questions.  [The e]vidence is so 
overwhelming.  There’s no reasonable person 
that could find that there wasn’t a violation of 
federal rights here by Officer Borrero. . . . 
 MR. KOBIN[, COUNSEL FOR THE 
LESENDES]:  There is a damage assessment. 
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 THE COURT:  Well, that’s true, 
damages will still be an issue. 
 MR. KOBIN:  Obviously I assume that 
you’re not directing a verdict on damages 
against him. 
 THE COURT:  Oh, no, only on liability. 
 MS. BENJAMIN[, COUNSEL FOR 
THE CITY]:  With respect to your ruling, the 
question on damages come[s] with respect to 
the City of Newark. 
 THE COURT:  What did I do to the City 
of Newark? 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  The questions that 
you have on damages, you indicate on the 
[verdict] sheet if they find yes for 1, 2, 3,
[3]
 or 
4,
[4] 
you have an issue of damages, and maybe 
this is another issue.  If you’re directing them to 
answer yes, for 1, 2[,] and 3, it may be I’m 
going to [suggest] to the Court that damages 
need to be separate.  There needs to be [] 
separate damages for Officer Borrero then, and 
one for the City of Newark. 
 MR. KOBIN:  No, your Honor, it’s 
punitive damages as to Officer Borrero, which 
would still be on the sheet. 
                                                 
3
 Questions 1, 2, and 3 concerned Officer Borrero’s 
liability. 
 
4
 Question 4 concerned the City’s liability. 
 
 10 
 THE COURT:  That is separate. 
 MR. KOBIN:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  Th[at] wouldn’t affect 
the City. 
 MR. KOBIN:  If you’re directing them to 
answer yes for 1, 2, and 3, it’s your position 
then that they would only get punitive damages.  
What if they find no?  Let’s just hypothetically 
find no against the City’s liability. 
 THE COURT:  Well, then, that’s it. 
 MR. KOBIN:  Well then -- 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  You follow what I’m 
saying? 
 MR. KOBIN:  They can still award in 
this case compensatory damages against Officer 
Borrero, couldn’t they?  Am I missing 
something? 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  It needs to be 
separate. 
 MR. KOBIN:  No, it’s still 
compensatory. 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  You just ruled that 
there’s a directed verdict with respect to the 
claims against Officer Borrero. 
 THE COURT:  Right. 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  Let’s say tomorrow 
the jury says: City of Newark, you’re not liable 
with respect to the damages aspect of it.  Then 
those damages are going to be against Officer 
Borrero. 
 THE COURT:  Right. 
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 MS. BENJAMIN:  I don’t know how it’s 
-- how it’s proposed here, clear to them, that 
that’s where the damages is [sic] coming from. 
 THE COURT:  Well, the damages, they 
probably won’t come from any place.  That’s 
what the long and short of it is.  If the City is 
held not liable, then you don’t care anymore. 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  Okay. 
 
(J.A. 569-73.) 
 
The jury retired to deliberate and returned a unanimous 
verdict, finding, as it had been directed by the District Court, 
that Officer Borrero was liable under each of the three 
Section 1983 claims raised against him.  The jury also 
separately and independently found that the City was liable 
for Lesende’s injuries because Officer Borrero’s wrongdoing 
was the “result of an official policy or custom of the City.”  
(J.A. 917.)  It then found that “the amount of compensatory 
damages to which Mrs. Lesende [wa]s entitled” was 
$2,700,000, that “the amount of compensatory damages to 
which Victor Lesende [wa]s entitled” was $75,000, and “the 
amount of the punitive damages to which Mrs. Lesende [wa]s 
entitled to recover against Officer Borrero” was $850,000.  
(Id.) 
 
The City thereafter moved for a new trial or, in the 
alternative, for remittitur from the jury’s award of $2,700,000 
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in compensatory damages to Lesende.
5
  It argued that it was 
entitled to “a new trial on damages as a matter of law,” but 
neither argued that it was entitled to nor suggested that it 
sought a new trial on liability.  (Suppl. App. 23 (emphasis 
added); see also Suppl. App. 20-24; Suppl. App. 26 (arguing 
that “a new trial on damages should be granted” (emphasis 
added)); Suppl. App. 28-31.)  It also argued in support of 
remittitur, comparing the facts presented and award granted in 
the first trial with the facts presented and awards granted in 
other excessive force cases. 
 
On October 7, 2011, the District Court entered an 
order (“the 10-7-11 Order”) and accompanying memorandum 
opinion, explaining its rationale for denying the City a new 
trial.  In an apparent overabundance of caution, the court 
couched its explanation in terms of both damages and 
liability.  See Lesende, 2011 WL 4765162, at *4, *8.  It 
correctly noted the inappropriateness of the City’s request for 
a new trial on damages, explaining that “[a] jury award may 
not be overturned merely because it is an ‘outlier’ or finds 
damages in excess of what the court would have determined 
on its own.”  Id. at *3.  It also found that the City “ha[d] 
offered no evidence that the [jury’s] finding of liability was 
                                                 
5
 Following review of the City’s motion and 
accompanying brief, the District Court concluded that the 
City did not challenge the jury’s award of compensatory 
damages to Mr. Lesende.  See Lesende v. Borrero, No. 06-
4967, 2011 WL 4765162, at *3 n.8 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2011).  
That conclusion has not been challenged. 
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the result of ‘passion or prejudice’” and concluded that any 
such argument would be rejected as “entirely assertionary.”  
Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
 
However, the court granted the motion insofar as the 
City sought remittitur of the jury’s award of compensatory 
damages to Lesende.  After examining several awards in 
excessive force and malicious prosecution cases,
6
 the court 
concluded that “[d]amages awards are highly fact-specific.  
Even among cases involving excessive force and malicious 
prosecution, prior verdicts are, at best, imperfect guides as to 
the range of reasonably acceptable jury verdicts.”  Id. at *6.  
Ultimately—based on the limited extent of Lesende’s 
physical injuries and both the nature of the City’s wrongdoing 
and “[t]he cumulative psychic effect of” its actions—the 
District Court concluded that Lesende’s compensatory 
damages award was “only barely” excessive and remitted it 
from $2,700,000 to $750,000.  Id. at *7.  In so doing, it was 
mindful to inform Lesende that she could choose to either 
accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a new 
trial, which would be limited to determining the quantum of 
her compensatory damages. 
                                                 
6
 We commend the District Court both for noting that 
“[i]t would be particularly inappropriate to order a drastic 
remittitur based on the handful of decisions submitted by [the 
City]” and “not confin[ing] itself to the self-serving cases in 
[the City’s] brief when great volumes of information exist[ed] 
on jury awards and settlements in excessive force and 
malicious prosecution cases.”  Lesende, 2011 WL 4765162, at 
*5. 
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Lesende moved for reconsideration of the order 
granting the City’s motion, and her reconsideration motion 
was denied.  She then timely rejected the remitted award. 
 
C. The Second Trial 
 The second jury trial was held in September of 2012.  
Both the Lesendes and the City appeared and were 
represented by counsel.  Officer Borrero neither appeared nor 
participated.
7
  Following trial, the second jury found that 
Lesende was entitled to a $4,000,000 compensatory damages 
award.   
 
                                                 
7
 Officer Borrero may have been unaware of the 
second trial.  On July 24, 2012, a notice appeared in the 
District Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing 
system (“CM/ECF”) that the second trial would begin on 
September 11, 2012.  That notice was electronically served to 
the parties through CM/ECF pursuant to the District Court’s 
Local Civil Rule 5.2 and ECF Policies and Procedures.  See 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ELECTRONIC CASE FILING POLICIES 
AND PROCEDURES (2012) ¶¶ 6 & 7, available at 
http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/PoliciesandProced
ures2012.pdf.  However, by July 24, 2012, Officer Borrero 
was acting pro se and had not registered to receive filed 
documents, including notices, electronically.  See id. at ¶¶ 
(1)(a), (4).  The record does not reflect that service was ever 
made directly on Officer Borrero pursuant to Local Civil Rule 
5.1(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2). 
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The City timely moved for remittitur of the second 
jury’s award, but it did not request a new trial.  In fact, the 
City explicitly asked the District Court to “refrain from 
ordering a new trial on damages,” arguing instead that “it 
would be in the best interests of all parties to permit an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review of 
both liability and damages, rather than order a third trial on 
damages only.”  (Suppl. App. 43.)  It also “respectfully 
urge[d]” the District Court that “[i]n the event that remittitur 
[wa]s granted and [Lesende] reject[ed] the reduced sum . . . 
the matter be deemed final for purposes of appeal.”  (Suppl. 
App. 60.) 
 
At argument on the City’s motion, the District Court 
questioned the propriety of the City’s request, and Lesende 
objected to the possibility that the District Court might grant a 
remittitur from the second jury’s verdict without providing 
the opportunity to choose between a remitted award and a 
third trial on damages.  As an alternative, the District Court 
suggested vacating the 10-7-11 Order and reinstating the first 
jury’s verdict.  This colloquy followed: 
 
THE COURT:  [H]ave you any 
suggestion how we could put this in the posture 
for appeal other than my entering an order 
vacating the original remittitur order? . . . It 
doesn’t go to the Third Circuit simply by you[r] 
saying so.  The Third Circuit has to have 
jurisdiction, and I don’t know how it would 
have jurisdiction if we’re caught in the midst [] 
of a remittitur situation. 
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 MR. KOBIN:  As your Honor suggested, 
you see the problem that I have with respect to 
this motion, if you were to deny this motion and 
reinstate the 2.7 million dollar verdict that came 
out the first time, we would lose our right to 
make arguments with respect to this second 
verdict that came out because I’m sure, from 
[Mrs.] Lesende’s point, she wants the 4 million 
dollar verdict to stand.  As [to] the 2.7 million 
dollar [verdict], I don’t know how that would 
work in terms of everything being appealable 
going to the Third Circuit if you were to deny 
this motion. 
 THE COURT:  Well, let’s assume that I 
vacate the original remittitur order and have a 
judgment of two million seven, then each -- 
then you would appeal. . . .  But on the other 
hand, I don’t see much point in going to another 
jury which would probably do the same thing. 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  Right.  Because, you 
know, if we go to another jury and they give 
less than 2.7 million dollars, I’m sure plaintiff 
will be filing [her] own motion, given what the 
other two verdicts w[ere].  Honestly, Judge, I’m 
at a loss because I don’t want to lose -- us to 
lose any of our appealable rights with respect to 
the first and second trial. 
 THE COURT:  Well, the second trial 
becomes academic if we reinstate the first trial 
and reinstate that verdict.  That might be the 
way to go, and then everybody will have an 
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appealable decision . . . .  I think that maybe the 
solution is to vacate the original remittitur, 
which puts us back to where we were before 
you moved for remittitur the first time.  And the 
Court of Appeals will see my original thinking 
and -- but I’m not confronted with a second jury 
which comes in with a 4 million dollar verdict.  
And as Mr. Kobin points out, we still rely on 
the jury system.  In the last analysis, it’s the 
jury that has to decide the amount and not the 
Judge, so I can’t just enter a judgment in an 
amount that I think is reasonable.  Well, I think 
then that’s what I’ll do. 
 MS. BENJAMIN:  Okay. 
 THE COURT:  So we can take it from 
there.  I’ll deny the present motion and vacate 
the original remittitur order, and enter judgment 
for 2 million, seven hundred thousand. 
 
(J.A. 792-94.) 
  
 The District Court’s final order followed.  That order 
vacated the second jury’s verdict, vacated the 10-7-11 Order, 
and reinstated the first jury’s verdict in full.  This appeal and 
cross-appeal followed. 
 
II. 
  
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and, to the extent 
that the action concerned certain state-law claims that are not 
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at issue on appeal, 1367(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
III. 
  
 The City first asks us to consider two separate but 
related issues: whether (1) the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to support the jury’s liability finding; and (2) the 
District Court erred by failing to order a new trial on liability.  
Lesende argues that the City waived both issues on appeal 
because it failed to raise the appropriate motions at trial under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59.  We agree.  
“‘Generally, failure to raise an issue in the District Court 
results in its waiver on appeal.’”  Webb v. City of Phila., 562 
F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Huber v. Taylor, 469 
F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a 
federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed 
on below.”).  “This general rule serves several important 
judicial interests,” including “protecting litigants from unfair 
surprise, promoting the finality of judgments and conserving 
judicial resources, and preventing district courts from being 
reversed on grounds that were never urged or argued before 
it.”  Webb, 562 F.3d at 263 (citations, internal quotation 
marks, and alterations omitted). 
 
 As noted above, the City did not move for judgment as 
a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a).  Because it did not 
raise such a motion, it “wholly waive[d] the right to mount 
any post-trial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.”  
Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1262 (3d Cir. 
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1991); see also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, 
Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400-04 (2006).  Indeed, “its failure to do 
so operates as a waiver with fatal consequences to its 
insufficiency of the evidence claim in this appeal.”  Greenleaf 
v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
 The City argues that it preserved its challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence by timely requesting a new trial 
on liability in the post-trial motion filed after the first trial 
concluded.  We find the City’s argument unavailing.  Neither 
the City’s notice of motion nor the accompanying brief 
indicate that the City sought a new trial on liability.  To the 
contrary, those papers indicate that the City, insofar as it 
sought a new trial, only sought a new trial on the 
compensatory damages awarded to Lesende.  Accordingly, 
they were incapable of preserving the issue for appeal.  Cf. 
Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre 
Asociado de Puerto Rico, 554 F.3d 164, 175-76 (1st Cir. 
2009) (rejecting defendant’s contention that certain issues 
were preserved by post-trial motion seeking either a new trial 
or remittitur where motion papers did not contain any related 
“developed argumentation” or relevant citations).  “Theories 
not raised squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for 
the first time on appeal. . . .  [I]f a claim is merely insinuated 
rather than actually articulated, that claim ordinarily is 
deemed unpreserved for purposes of appellate review.”  Id. at 
176 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations 
omitted). 
 
Three findings support our conclusion.  First, the 
language used in both the notice of motion and accompanying 
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brief belie the City’s contention that it sought a new trial on 
liability.  The notice of motion states only that the City sought 
“a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. [sic] 59 as a matter of 
law.”  (Suppl. App. 16-17.)  But the supporting brief makes 
clear that the City sought only “a new trial on damages.”  
(Suppl. App. 26 (emphasis added); see also Suppl. App. 23 
(stating in title of subsection presenting legal argument that 
“Defendant City of Newark is Entitled to a New Trial on 
Damages as a Matter of Law” (emphasis added)); Suppl. 
App. 31 (“If the court is not inclined to grant a new trial on 
damages, in the alternative, a remittitur . . . should be 
granted.”).)  
 
Second, the City’s “Statement of Facts” does not 
address any facts that might have influenced the District 
Court’s decision not to grant a new trial on liability.  Instead, 
those paragraphs merely detail the evidence offered at the 
first trial to support Lesende’s prayer for compensatory relief.  
They do not and cannot be construed to relate to any City 
customs, policies, or practices that would either support or 
undermine a finding of liability under Section 1983 and 
Monell. 
 
Finally, the City’s argument before the District Court 
belies the argument raised on appeal.  The brief filed in 
support of the City’s motion recognized that the District 
Court could grant a new trial as a matter of law on several 
bases, including: “the verdict is against the clear weight of the 
evidence; damages are excessive; the trial was unfair; [or] 
substantial errors were made in the admission or rejection of 
evidence or the giving or refusing of instructions.”  (Suppl. 
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App. 23.)  It then set forth the body of law related to 
excessive damage awards but failed to set forth any argument 
that the first jury’s verdict on liability was against the clear 
weight of the evidence.  The absence of such argument 
strongly indicates that the City did not intend to seek and 
never actually sought a new trial on liability from the District 
Court. 
  
 These same three points cut against the City’s 
argument that we may now assign error to the District Court 
for not ordering a new trial on liability.  The City’s failure to 
seek such relief from the District Court results in the waiver 
of that issue on appeal.  See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120; Webb, 
562 F.3d at 263; see also Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Merely reciting the Rule 59(a) standard and 
then tossing the motion into the court’s lap is not enough.  
Failure to adequately present an issue to the district court 
waives the issue on appeal.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
  
 The City alternatively argues that the issue at hand—
i.e., the propriety of a new trial on its liability—was preserved 
by the District Court’s sua sponte consideration and 
discussion of that issue in the memorandum opinion that 
accompanied the 10-7-11 Order, pursuant to Rule 59(d).  The 
first and second sentences of Rule 59(d) grant the District 
Court power to order a new trial on its own accord under two 
circumstances: first, “for any reason that would justify 
granting one on a party’s motion” if the court enters its order 
within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment; and 
second, “[a]fter giving the parties notice and an opportunity 
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to be heard, . . . for a reason not stated in the motion.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 59(d). 
 
 It matters not whether the District Court’s discussion 
and, ultimately, rejection of the prospect of a new trial on 
liability arose under the first or the second sentence of Rule 
59(d).  As applied here, it is a distinction without difference; 
the end result is the same.  Because the District Court failed 
to enter its memorandum opinion within twenty-eight days of 
the entry of judgment,
8
 it lacked jurisdiction under the first 
sentence of Rule 59(d) to consider the propriety of a new trial 
on liability on its own accord.  See Cortez v. Trans Union, 
LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing Demeretz 
v. Daniels Motor Freight, Inc., 307 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1962)); 
Tarlton v. Exxon, 688 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1982); Chi. & 
N. W. Ry. Co. v. Britten, 301 F.2d 400, 402-03 (8th Cir. 
1962).
9
  Further, because the record demonstrates that the 
District Court neither provided notice to Lesende that it 
would consider that issue nor gave her an opportunity to be 
heard on it, the District Court lacked power to grant the City 
                                                 
8
 Judgment was entered on June 28, 2011.  The District 
Court entered the memorandum opinion at issue over 100 
days later, on October 7, 2011. 
 
9
 Demeretz was decided prior to the 2009 amendment 
to Rule 59(d), which extended the time for sua sponte action 
by the District Court from ten to twenty-eight days.  It 
nevertheless retains its precedential value, and it accordingly 
guides us now. 
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relief under the second sentence of Rule 59(d).  See Valtrol, 
Inc. v. Gen. Connectors Corp., 884 F.2d 149, 155-56 (4th Cir. 
1989) (“The notice requirement may not be ironclad, but the 
rule clearly contemplates notice in the ordinary case.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 
Because the District Court did not comply with the 
jurisdictional and procedural aspects of Rule 59(d), it lacked 
power to sua sponte consider the propriety of a new trial.  
Accordingly, the court’s discussion of that issue did not 
preserve it for appeal.  This conclusion accords with well-
settled waiver principles and serves the judiciary’s interest in 
promoting the finality of judgments and preventing reversal 
on grounds that were not argued below. 
 
IV. 
  
 The City next argues that the District Court erred 
because it failed to instruct the jury to apportion Lesende’s 
compensatory damages award between it and Officer Borrero.  
It appears from the City’s briefing on this matter that the 
alleged error rose in the first trial.  In any case, we disagree 
that the lack of instruction was legal error.
10
 
  
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides that a 
party objecting to either a jury instruction or the lack of an 
                                                 
10
 We would reach the same conclusion, albeit for 
slightly different reasons, had the City argued that the error 
rose in the second trial. 
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instruction must raise the objection “on the record, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the 
objection.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 51(c)(1).  Such an objection must 
be both cogent and specific to the alleged error.  See Palmer 
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 119 (1943) (“In fairness to the trial 
court and to the parties, objections to a [jury] charge must be 
sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of 
the alleged error.  Where a party might have obtained the 
correct charge by specifically calling the attention of the trial 
court to the error and where part of the charge was correct, he 
may not through a general exception obtain a new trial.”); 
Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 
F.3d 976, 993 (3d Cir. 1996).  As a general rule, a party who 
fails to either cogently raise a specific objection or state the 
grounds of the objection at trial waives related arguments on 
appeal.  See Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 739 (3d Cir. 
1990).  “The requirement that we consider only those 
objections to jury instructions that were raised before the 
district court reflects the ‘policy that an appellate court will 
not predicate error on an issue upon which the district court 
was not provided with an opportunity to rule.’”  Id. (quoting 
Remington Rand Corp. v. Bus. Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1267 
(3d Cir. 1987)). 
 
 The City raises two arguments on the lack of an 
apportionment instruction that we must now address.  It first 
argues that it raised a clear objection to the lack of an 
apportionment instruction during the first trial.  Following 
careful review of the record, we disagree.  During that trial, 
Lesende moved for a directed verdict against Officer Borrero, 
and her motion was granted.  The City then raised some 
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concern over the jury’s verdict sheet, stating its opinion that 
“[t]here needs to be [] separate damages for Officer Borrero 
then, and one for the City of Newark.”  (J.A. 572.)  But it 
appears inarguable that the City’s objection was not clear and 
cogent, that it was not sufficiently specific, and that it failed 
to state the grounds upon which it rested.  
 
 We find support for this conclusion in both Lesende’s 
and the District Court’s respective responses to the City’s 
suggestion regarding “separate damages.”  That suggestion 
prompted only a brief discussion on tangentially related 
issues, i.e., liability and punitive damages.  Had the City 
cogently presented its argument, as it has on appeal, then 
logic and common sense dictate that either Lesende or the 
District Court, or both, would have recognized and directly 
responded to the City’s concern.  At the very least, we are 
hard-pressed to believe that the District Court would have 
responded only by way of non sequitur. 
 
 Further, we find analogous support in our precedent.  
In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, supra, we held that an 
objection to jury instructions was waived where an objection 
was not presented “with sufficient clarity to give the trial 
judge notice of a possible error in the instruction.”  89 F.3d at 
993.  “Not only was the objection difficult to understand 
because of its convoluted grammar, but the objection did not 
specify the authority upon which it was based.  Therefore . . . 
[it] failed to comply with Rule 51’s requirement that an 
objection ‘stat[e] distinctly . . . the grounds of the objection.’”  
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
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 It follows from our discussion in Chemical Leaman 
Tank Lines that we should here, too, conclude that the 
objection at issue was not raised through sufficiently clear 
argument.  We are mindful that a contrary conclusion might 
leave erudite trial judges “to do counsel’s work, creat[ing] the 
ossature for the argument, and put[ting] flesh on its bones.”  
Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.  Any circumstance that leaves 
district judges responsible for the resolution of inarticulate, 
incomprehensible, or otherwise unsupported objections is 
untenable.  As recognized in another context, “Judges are not 
expected to be mindreaders.  Consequently, a litigant has an 
obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, 
or else forever hold its peace.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
 The City has alternatively asked us to examine the lack 
of an apportionment instruction for plain error.  Cf. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (“A court may consider a plain error in the 
instructions that has not been preserved . . . if the error affects 
substantial rights.”).  “Under the plain error standard, we 
consider, inter alia, the obviousness of the error, the 
significance of the interest involved, and the reputation of 
judicial proceedings if the error stands uncorrected.”  
Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 
340 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Such “review is discretionary—it should be 
exercised sparingly and should only be invoked with extreme 
caution in the civil context.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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 The City contends that the lack of apportionment 
instruction resulted in plain error because the City was held 
jointly and severally liable for Lesende’s compensatory 
damages under the theory of respondeat superior.  If the 
City’s liability was premised on that theory, then we could 
find some weight in its argument.  However, the jury made a 
separate finding that the City’s liability stemmed from its own 
unconstitutional policy or custom, in accord with Section 
1983 and Monell.  That finding defeats any inference that the 
lack of an apportionment instruction caused the jury to not 
consider the City’s liability, separate and apart from that of 
Officer Borrero. 
 
Upon our review of various Monell actions, it at least 
appears plausible that the City could have been held jointly 
and severally liable with Officer Borrero.  See DiSorbo v. 
Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he City is at a 
minimum jointly and severally liable for compensatory 
damages pursuant to its liability under Monell.”); Berry v. 
City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating 
that “pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell, 
there is no respondeat superior liability as to municipalities” 
but concluding that a City as “master” may be held liable “for 
the tort of the servant” if the jury “goes through the ‘custom 
or policy’ analysis and ties in a city in that manner”); White-
Ruiz v. City of New York, 983 F. Supp. 365, 390-96 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (finding that both police officers who violated Section 
1983 and city found liable under Monell were jointly and 
severally liable); cf. Quinn v. Fresno Cnty. Sheriff, No. 10-
1617, 2012 WL 6561562, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2012) 
(concluding that county could not be held jointly and 
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severally liable because plaintiff neither alleged nor prevailed 
on a Monell claim), recons. granted on other grounds, 2013 
WL 898136 (Mar. 8, 2013).  It thus appears that the proper 
course—that is, the proper jury instruction—was unclear 
under current law.  In that circumstance, there can be no 
finding of plain error.  See Collins v. Alco Parking Corp., 448 
F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Franklin Prescriptions, 
424 F.3d at 343).
11
 
 
V. 
 
 The most concerning issue raised to this Court is the 
issue highlighted by both Lesende and the City: the District 
Court’s vacatur of the second jury’s verdict, vacatur of the 
10-7-11 Order, and reinstatement of the first jury’s verdict. 
 
 We are concerned, in part, because both Lesende and 
the City invited the very error that they complain of on 
appeal.  They have thus invoked our consideration of the 
invited error doctrine.  “The doctrine of ‘invited error’ refers 
to ‘[a]n error that a party cannot complain of on appeal 
because the party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted 
the trial court to make the erroneous ruling.’”  Lima v. 
Newark Police Dep’t, 658 F.3d 324, 333 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 622 (9th ed. 2009)).  
“That is to say, ‘[w]hen a litigant takes an unequivocal 
                                                 
11
 Because we are bound by the plain error standard of 
review, it is of no consequence that this Court has yet to rule 
on the issue, and we do not do so now. 
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position at trial, he cannot on appeal assume a contrary 
position simply because the decision in retrospect was a 
tactical mistake, or perhaps a candid but regretted 
concession.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fleck v. 
KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1992)); 
see also Morrow v. May, 735 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(equating invited error “with the adage that turnabout is fair 
play”). 
 
Before us, the City argues that the District Court 
improperly “derive[d] [a] remedy” consisting of “procedural 
maneuvering” that “create[d] appellate jurisdiction and . . . 
avoid[ed] a fully-warranted third trial.”  (City Br. at 2, 6; 
accord City Br. at 22-23 (“[T]o avoid a third trial and make 
sure that an order was appealable to the jurisdiction of this 
Court, the trial court concocted a remedy . . . .”); see also City 
Br. at 28 (faulting the District Court for actions that “were not 
based upon the merits or for justice, but because the court was 
attempting to avoid a third trial and trying to create 
jurisdiction for appeal,” and arguing that “[t]hose factors 
improperly influenced the trial court’s decision making 
process”).)  That is a totally inappropriate mischaracterization 
of the District Court’s actions.  When moving for remittitur of 
the second jury’s verdict, the City explicitly asked the District 
Court to enter an order reducing the jury’s award of 
compensatory damages, “refrain from ordering a new trial on 
damages,” and ensure that “the matter be deemed final for 
purposes of appeal.”  (Suppl. App. 43, 60.) 
 
Lesende, too, participated in the creation of the scheme 
of which she now complains.  At oral argument on the City’s 
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motion, she argued that the City’s request, if granted, would 
deprive her of her Seventh Amendment right to a conditional 
remittitur—that is, one that afforded her the opportunity to 
choose between the remitted award and a new trial on 
damages.  Cf. Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty., 523 U.S. 208, 
211-12 (1998) (per curiam); Cortez, 617 F.3d at 716.  She 
could and perhaps should have rested on that argument.  
Instead, however, she at least tacitly approved the proposed 
vacatur of the second verdict and reinstatement of the first 
verdict.  At oral argument, her attorney conceded that he did 
not object to that scheme because he believed that Lesende 
would accept a judgment that awarded her $2,700,000 in 
compensatory damages. 
 
On these bases, we are disinclined to afford relief to 
either the City or Lesende.  The City assumed a tactical 
stance, which it hoped would reduce the second jury’s award 
of $4,000,000 to as little as $750,000—the remitted sum 
offered to Lesende after the first trial.  In so doing, it 
concocted the very procedural scheme of which it now 
complains, one that would afford it great benefit while 
circumventing Lesende’s Seventh Amendment right to a new 
jury trial on damages.  Lesende, for her part, assumed a 
tactical position that was both complimentary and 
contradictory to the City’s position, obviating the need for a 
new trial while ensuring that she would receive $2,700,000 
rather than some other lesser amount (e.g., $750,000).  
Because neither party has clean hands, equity counsels 
against granting either of these parties the relief that they seek 
on appeal. 
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Our inquiry, under normal circumstances, would end 
with our finding of invited error.
12
  But we are concerned by 
the vacatur of the 10-7-11 Order insofar as the District Court 
stated, without explanation, that the 10-7-11 order was 
“improvidently entered.”  (J.A. 4.)  In the wake created by the 
absence of a meaningful explanation, we are constrained to 
conclude that the vacatur of the 10-7-11 order was, as invited 
by the City and Lesende, prompted by desire to resolve the 
City’s motion while contemporaneously avoiding a new trial 
on damages and immediately vesting this Court with 
appellate jurisdiction. 
 
Those factors, whether considered individually or in 
sum, were not a proper basis for revisiting and vacating the 
10-7-11 order.  And, ultimately, the District Court’s 
consideration of those factors led it to violate the doctrine of 
law of the case—“an amorphous concept” that “directs a 
court’s discretion” but “does not limit [its] power.”  Pepper v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1250 (2011) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Pharm. 
Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Pursuant to that doctrine, “[a] court has the power to 
revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in 
                                                 
12
 Certain recognized exceptions to the invited error 
doctrine do not apply here.  See, e.g., United States v. Maury, 
695 F.3d 227, 257 (3d Cir. 2012) (appellant may argue that its 
proposed jury instructions were erroneous in light of 
subsequent, retroactively applied appellate rulings), cert. 
denied sub nom. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013). 
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any circumstance.”  In re Pharm. Benefit Antitrust Litig., 582 
F.3d at 439 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)).  But “‘courts should be 
loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances 
such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and 
would make a manifest injustice.’”  Id. (quoting Christianson, 
486 U.S. at 816); accord Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1250; Arizona 
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983). 
 
The District Court did not explain how or why its 
earlier decision was improvidently granted, and, on appeal, 
we cannot find a basis for concluding that it was clearly 
erroneous.  To the contrary, we find the District Court’s 
earlier decision to be well-rooted in both law and fact.  We 
are thus forced to conclude that the 10-7-11 Order was not 
“improvidently entered,” and, similarly, we are forced to 
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by 
revisiting and vacating that order. 
 
VI. 
 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm on all issues 
other than those concerning the District Court’s final order, 
which was entered on February 21, 2013, and, inter alia, 
vacated the order entered on October 7, 2011.  We will vacate 
the District Court’s final order with instructions to reinstate 
the second jury’s verdict and resolve the City’s related motion 
for remittitur on its merits.  If the District Court grants that 
motion, then it should be mindful to preserve Lesende’s right 
to choose between a remitted award and a third trial on her 
compensatory damages.  Further, for the reasons discussed in 
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footnotes 2 and 7, supra, we suggest that the District Court 
take whatever efforts it deems reasonable to ensure that 
Officer Borrero is notified of subsequent proceedings. 
